

Discussion of Economic Conditions Financial Markets Overview

US firms, bank credit, and rising interest rates


Miguel Faria-e-Castro Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

October 26, 2022



These slides have been screened to ensure that no confidential bank or firm-level data have been revealed as per S&R NAMS regulations.

Corporate debt surpassed household debt prior to the pandemic



Sources: FRED, Flow of Funds

Question: How vulnerable are US nonfinancial firms to rising interest rates?

Data: Use FR Y-14Q confidential micro-data on firm loans and financials

- ullet Stress-testing regulatory data, universe of loan facilities >\$1 million for \sim 30 large BHCs
- Close to 80% of total Commercial & Industrial (C&I) lending in the US

Approach

- Facts on the composition of bank lending in the US
- 2. How have firm financials evolved during the pandemic and the recovery?
- 3. Are firm balance sheets prepared for rising interest rates?

Findings

- US firm financial conditions better in many respects than in 2019
- US firms resilient to interest rate increases in spite of large shares of variable-rate debt

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
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80% of loans are variable (or mixed) rate \Rightarrow very different from households



Source: Y-14Q.

Y-14Q, Firm Financials, and Rate Hikes Plending by industry

Y-14Q contains annual data on firm financials.

- Unique source of financial data for non-Compustat (private) firms in the US
- 286,000 unique firms for the 2014-22 period ▶ firm count

- 1. Document changes in the distribution of firm financials
- 2. "Stress test" firm financials with respect to interest rate hikes

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
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
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Return on assets and default probabilities, 2019-2021

Distribution of RoA improved with respect to 2019, default probabilities mostly back to 2019 levels.



Firms are (i) less leveraged and (ii) hold more liquid assets (Ebsim, Faria-e-Castro & Kozlowski, 2022).



Stress testing US firms

- ullet Majority of debt is variable-rate \Rightarrow firms are exposed to interest rate hikes
- Consider effect of rising federal funds rate on
 - 1. Firm net income
 - 2. How many firms become insolvent?
 - 3. How many firms become illiquid?
- Scenarios
 - Tightening as of Oct. 2022, 2.56%
 - Median SEP value at the end of 2022, 4.4%
 - Median SEP value at the end of 2023, 4.6%

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Impact on firm financials: baseline

Assume that impact on net income at time $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ is given by

 $\mathsf{Net}\;\mathsf{Income}_\tau = \mathsf{Net}\;\mathsf{Income}_{2021} - \Delta \mathit{FFR}_\tau \times (\mathsf{Variable}\text{-Rate}\;\mathsf{Debt}_{2021} + \psi \times \mathsf{Non}\text{-Variable}\text{-Rate}\;\mathsf{Debt}_{2021})$

where $\psi=0.18$ ho passthrough estimates

| | Data, 2021 | 2.6% FFR (Oct. 22) | 4.4% FFR (22) | 4.6% FFR (23) |
|-----------------------------|------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Median Δ Int. Exp. | | +15.56% | +38.19% | |
| % firms with Net Income < 0 | 14.74% | 15.86% | 16.79% | 16.83% |
| % of insolvent firms | | | | |
| % of illiquid firms | 16.46% | 16.73% | 16.89% | 16.90% |

Definitions

- Firm is insolvent when Equity + Net Income < 0
- Firm is illiquid when Net Current Assets + Net Income < 0

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| % firms with Net Income < 0 | 14.74% | 15.86% | 16.79% | 16.83% |
| % of insolvent firms | 8.72% | 8.97% | 9.06% | 9.06% |
| % of illiquid firms | 16.46% | 16.73% | 16.89% | 16.90% |

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Discussion & Robustness

- Firm financials look resilient even in the 4.4% and 4.6% scenarios
- These are back-of-the-envelope calculations
 - 1. Overestimates: do not account for changing firm behavior
 - Need to account for optimal response of quantity and type of borrowing
 - Composition elasticities are small in practice behavior estimates, 2015-19 tightening
 - 2. Underestimates: do not account for changing (deteriorating?) macro conditions sales impact


- Business debt surpassed household debt in the recent past, spiked during pandemic
- > 80% of business loans are variable-rate
 - Nonfinancial firms much more exposed to monetary policy tightening than households
- US firm financial conditions better in many respects than in 2019
 - Higher RoA, lower leverage, higher liquidity ratios
- US firms resilient to interest rate hikes in spite of large shares of variable-rate debt
 - Δ % of firms with negative profits: +2.09 pp
 - Δ % of insolvent firms: +0.34 pp
 - Δ % of illiquid firms: +0.44 pp
 - Changes are small even for the central SEP scenario, FFR = 4.4%

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APPENDIX




lending

Close to 80% total C&I lending


"Perfect" coverage for large BHC

Source: Call Reports, Y-14Q.



Source: Y-14Q.


C&I Lending: interest rate spreads **▶** back



Source: Y-14Q.


Lending by Industry, NAICS2 Phack






Source: Y-14Q






- Credit lines ~ 50% of utilized exposures
- CL utilization ↑ during the pandemic
- Term loans around $\sim 35\%$
- Others: capitalized lease obligations, standby letters of credit, etc.




Source: Y-14Q.

Firms are paying lower rates on their debt.



Source: Y-14Q.

Interest expenses to net income ratio more concentrated around zero.



2015-19 tightening Phack

- FFR rose from 0.12% in Nov. 2015 to 2.40% in July 2019
- Median interest expenses rose by 59.7% between 2015 and 2019
- Median total debt rose by 26.4%
- Median net income grew by 35%

| | Data, 2015 | 2.40% FFR, 2019 |
|------------------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Median impact on interest expenses | | +59.7% |
| Share of firms with Net Income < 0 | 16.04% | 17.51% |
| Share of insolvent firms | 10.13% | 10.68% |
| Share of illiquid firms | 19.61% | 17.93% |



Estimate the following regression:

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta FFR_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

where $R_{i,t}$ is the average interest rate on loans for firm i

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------|
| | Avg. Int. Rate | New Int. Rate | Non Var. Int. Rate |
| FFR | 0.595*** | 0.776*** | 0.180*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.002) |
| Observations | 3511266 | 185996 | 1433526 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.507 | 0.390 | 0.553 |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses

^{*} p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01



Estimate the following regression:

$$\phi_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta FFR_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

where $\phi_{i,t}$ is firm i's share of variable rate debt

| | (1) |
|----------------|-----------|
| FFR | -0.133*** |
| | (0.015) |
| Observations | 3511266 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.828 |
| Firm FE | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses

^{*} $\rho <$ 0.10, ** $\rho <$ 0.05, *** $\rho <$ 0.01



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Net
$$Income_{\tau} = Net \ Income_{2021} - \Delta FFR_{\tau} \times (Variable-Rate \ Debt_{2021} + \psi \times Non-Variable-Rate \ Debt_{2021}) + \Delta FFR_{\tau} \times \beta_{FFR} \times Sales_{2021}$$

where $\psi=$ 0.18 and $eta_{\mathsf{FFR}}=-1.3$ from estimating

$$\frac{\Delta \mathsf{Sales}_{i,t}}{\mathsf{Sales}_{i,t-1}} = \alpha_i + \beta_{\mathsf{FFR}} \mathit{FFR}_t + \beta_{\mathsf{GDP}} \frac{\Delta \, Y_t}{Y_{t-1}} + \mathit{v}_{i,t}$$

| | Data, 2021 | 2.6% FFR (Oct. 22) | 4.4% FFR (22) | 4.6% FFR (23) |
|-----------------------------|------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| % firms with Net Income < 0 | 14.76% | 25.53% | 47.15% | 48.15% |
| % of insolvent firms | 8.72% | 9.68% | 11.71% | 11.86% |
| % of illiquid firms | 16.44% | 17.73% | 21.38% | 21.57% |